Analisado por: Kim Benedict Victorio   
 

Win64:Malware-gen (AVAST)

 Plataforma:

Windows

 Classificao do risco total:
 Potencial de dano:
 Potencial de distribuição:
 infecção relatada:
 Exposição das informações:
Baixo
Medium
Alto
Crítico

  • Tipo de grayware:
    Ransomware

  • Destrutivo:
    Não

  • Criptografado:
    Não

  • In the Wild:
    Sim

  Visão geral

Canal de infecção: Fallen gelassen von anderer Malware

It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.

Löscht Dateien in bestimmten Ordnern, so dass Programme und Anwendungen nicht ordnungsgemäß ausgeführt werden.

  Detalhes técnicos

Tipo de compactação: 663,424 bytes
Tipo de arquivo: EXE
Residente na memória: Não
Data de recebimento das amostras iniciais: 22 fevereiro 2023
Carga útil: Drops files, Deletes files, Modifies system registry, Terminates processes, Disables AV, Connects to URLs/IPs

Übertragungsdetails

It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.

Installation

Schleust die folgenden Dateien ein:

  • %System Root%\SystemData\MsExchangeLog1.log
  • %System Root%\SystemData\t8bjd27 (delete after)
  • %System Root%\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico

(Hinweis: %System Root% ist der Stammordner, normalerweise C:\. Dort befindet sich auch das Betriebssystem.)

Fügt die folgenden Prozesse hinzu:

  • %System&\svchost.exe -s 63389936
  • /c ping 1 1 1 -n 10 > Nul & fsutil file setZeroData offset=0 length=663424 "{Malware Path}{Malware Name}" & Del {Malware Path}{Malware Name} /F /Q
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k NetworkService
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k LocalService
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k regsvc

(Hinweis: %System% ist der Windows Systemordner. Er lautet in der Regel C:\Windows\System unter Windows 98 und ME, C:\WINNT\System32 unter Windows NT und 2000 sowie C:\Windows\System32 unter Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, Server 2003(32-bit), Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64bit) and 10(64-bit).)

Erstellt die folgenden Ordner:

  • %System Root%\SystemData

(Hinweis: %System Root% ist der Stammordner, normalerweise C:\. Dort befindet sich auch das Betriebssystem.)

Fügt die folgenden Mutexe hinzu, damit nur jeweils eine ihrer Kopien ausgeführt wird:

  • Global\d844900fbb575e14e52e60f2dbacaed8be2ed9effa9d82c84e86fee2e4d24d53

Injiziert Code in die folgenden Prozesse:

  • %System&\svchost.exe -s 63389936

Andere Systemänderungen

Löscht Dateien in den folgenden Ordnern:

  • %Application Data%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\
  • %User Temp%
  • %Temp%

(Hinweis: %Application Data% ist der Ordner 'Anwendungsdaten' für den aktuellen Benutzer, normalerweise C:\Windows\Profile\{Benutzername}\Anwendungsdaten unter Windows 98 und ME, C:\WINNT\Profile\{Benutzername}\Anwendungsdaten unter Windows NT, C:\Dokumente und Einstellungen\{Benutzername}\Lokale Einstellungen\Anwendungsdaten unter Windows 2000(32-bit), XP und Server 2003(32-bit) und C:\Users\{Benutzername}\AppData\Roaming on Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit) und 10(64-bit).. %User Temp% ist der Ordner 'Temp' des aktuellen Benutzers, normalerweise C:\Dokumente und Einstellungen\{Benutzername}\Lokale Einstellungen\Temp unter Windows 2000(32-bit), XP und Server 2003(32-bit) und C:\Users\{Benutzername}\AppData\Local\Temp unter Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit) und 10(64-bit).. %Temp% ist der Windows Ordner für temporäre Dateien, normalerweise C:\Windows\Temp oder C:\WINNT\Temp.)

Fügt die folgenden Registrierungseinträge hinzu:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CLASSES\
.blackbytent
(Default) = ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\
.blackbytent\DefaultIcon
(Default) = n:\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\
System
EnableLinkedConnections = 1

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\
System
LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy = 1

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
s1159 = BLACKBYTE

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
s2359 = BLACKBYTE

Löscht die folgenden Registrierungsschlüssel:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
vssadmin.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
wbadmin.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
bcdedit.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
powershell.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
diskshadow.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
net.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
taskkill.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
wmic.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
fsutil.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Raccine

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\
Services\EventLog\Application\
Raccine

HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-2272379601-2892648605-4202271867-1000\SOFTWARE\
Raccine

HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-2272379601-2892648605-4202271867-1000\SOFTWARE\
Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
Run\Raccine Tray

Verbreitung

Verwendet den folgenden Dateinamen und das folgende Kennwort, um auf kennwortgeschützte Freigabelaufwerke zuzugreifen:

  • username: {company name}\administrator
  • password: P@$$w0rd

Prozessbeendigung

Beendet die folgenden Dienste, wenn sie auf dem betroffenen System gefunden werden:

  • CybereasonRansomFree
  • vnetd
  • bpcd
  • TeraCopyService
  • msftesql
  • nsService
  • klvssbridge64
  • vapiendpoint
  • ShMonitor
  • Smcinst
  • SmcService
  • SntpService
  • svcGenericHost
  • swi_
  • TmCCSF
  • tmlisten
  • TrueKey
  • TrueKeyScheduler
  • TrueKeyServiceHelper
  • WRSVC,McTaskManager
  • OracleClientCache80
  • mfefire
  • wbengine
  • mfemms
  • RESvc
  • mfevtp
  • sacsvr
  • SAVAdminService
  • SAVService
  • SepMasterService
  • PDVFSService
  • ESHASRV
  • SDRSVC
  • FA_Scheduler
  • KAVFS
  • KAVFSGT
  • kavfsslp
  • klnagent
  • macmnsvc
  • masvc
  • MBAMService
  • MBEndpointAgent
  • McShield
  • Antivirus
  • AVP
  • DCAgent
  • bedbg
  • EhttpSrv
  • MMS
  • ekrn
  • EPSecurityService
  • EPUpdateService
  • ntrtscan
  • EsgShKernel
  • msexchangeadtopology
  • AcrSch2Svc
  • MSOLAP$TPSAMA
  • Intel(R) PROSet Monitoring
  • msexchangeimap4
  • ARSM
  • unistoresvc_1af40a
  • ReportServer$TPS
  • MSOLAP$SYSTEM_BGC
  • W3Svc
  • MSExchangeSRS
  • ReportServer$TPSAMA
  • Zoolz 2 Service
  • MSOLAP$TPS
  • aphidmonitorservice
  • SstpSvc
  • MSExchangeMTA
  • ReportServer$SYSTEM_BGC
  • Symantec System Recovery
  • UI0Detect
  • MSExchangeSA
  • MSExchangeIS
  • ReportServer
  • MsDtsServer110
  • POP3Svc
  • MSExchangeMGMT
  • SMTPSvc
  • MsDtsServer
  • IisAdmin
  • MSExchangeES
  • EraserSvc11710
  • Enterprise Client Service
  • MsDtsServer100
  • NetMsmqActivator
  • stc_raw_agent
  • VSNAPVSS
  • PDVFSService
  • AcrSch2Svc
  • Acronis
  • CASAD2DWebSvc
  • CAARCUpdateSvc
  • McAfee
  • avpsus
  • DLPAgentService
  • mfewc
  • BMR Boot Service
  • DefWatch
  • ccEvtMgr
  • ccSetMgr
  • SavRoam
  • RTVscan
  • QBFCService
  • QBIDPService
  • IntuitQuickBooksFCS
  • QBCFMonitorService
  • YooIT
  • zhudongfangyu
  • raccine
  • cylance
  • screenconnect
  • ransom
  • sqltelemetry
  • msexch
  • vnc
  • teamviewer
  • msolap
  • veeam
  • backup
  • sql
  • memtas
  • vss
  • sophos
  • svc$
  • mepocs

Beendet die folgenden Prozesse, wenn sie im Speicher des betroffenen Systems ausgeführt werden:

  • teracopy
  • nsservice
  • nsctrl
  • uranium
  • processhacker
  • procmon
  • pestudio
  • procmon64
  • x32dbg
  • x64dbg
  • cff explorer
  • procexp
  • pslist
  • tcpview
  • tcpvcon
  • dbgview
  • rammap
  • rammap64
  • vmmap
  • ollydbg
  • autoruns
  • autorunsc
  • filemon
  • regmon
  • idaq
  • idaq64
  • immunitydebugger
  • wireshark
  • dumpcap
  • hookexplorer
  • importrec
  • petools
  • lordpe
  • sysinspector
  • proc_analyzer
  • sysanalyzer
  • sniff_hit
  • windbg
  • joeboxcontrol
  • joeboxserver
  • joeboxserver
  • resourcehacker
  • fiddler
  • httpdebugger
  • dumpit
  • rammap
  • rammap64
  • vmmap
  • agntsvc
  • cntaosmgr
  • dbeng50
  • dbsnmp
  • encsvc
  • infopath
  • isqlplussvc
  • mbamtray
  • msaccess
  • msftesql
  • mspub
  • mydesktopqos
  • mydesktopservice
  • mysqld
  • mysqld-nt
  • mysqld-opt
  • Ntrtscan
  • ocautoupds
  • ocomm
  • ocssd
  • onenote
  • oracle
  • outlook
  • PccNTMon
  • powerpnt
  • sqbcoreservice
  • sql
  • sqlagent
  • sqlbrowser
  • sqlservr
  • sqlwriter
  • steam
  • synctime
  • tbirdconfig
  • thebat
  • thebat64
  • thunderbird
  • tmlisten
  • visio
  • winword
  • wordpad
  • xfssvccon
  • zoolz

Andere Details

It connects to the following possibly malicious URL:

  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.150
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.248
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.136
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.135
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.154
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.22
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.101
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.253
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.97
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.169
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.192
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.24
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.100
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.105
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.208
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.136
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.213
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.216
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.214
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.218
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.239
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.225
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.231
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.230
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.125
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.160
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.152
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.5
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.6
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.38
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.66
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.167
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.235
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.11
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.9
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.85
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.143
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.211
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.4
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.116
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.96
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.174
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.201
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.13
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.9
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.12
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.7
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.10
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.28
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.24
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.29
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.38
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.39
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.37
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.51
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.43
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.42
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.19
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.20
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.21
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.16
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.18
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.25
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.72
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.80
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.81
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.89
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.101
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.104
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.105
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.102
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.112
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.113
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.117
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.120
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.175
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.126
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.142
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.166
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.110
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.5
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.156
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.10
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.34
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.35
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.39
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.38
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.44
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.69
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.68
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.88
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.90
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.93
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.96
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.134
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.156
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.180
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.209
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.218
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.225
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.252
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.8
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.89
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.88
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.90
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.114
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.175
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.216
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.217
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.48
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.56
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.61
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.65
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.66
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.67
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.74
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.76
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.87
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.85
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.107
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.101
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.105
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.108
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.123
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.119
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.125
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.122
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.188
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.191
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.196
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.202
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.73
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.82
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.146
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.159
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.91
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.115
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.251
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.37
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.60
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.95
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.138
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.160
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.166
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.236
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.245
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.54
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.128
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.25
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.95
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.150
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.28
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.141
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.180
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.1
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.8
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.64
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.203
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.200
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.131
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.132
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.217
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.3
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.2
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.71
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.69
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.241
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.228
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.4
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.4
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.249
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.231
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.140
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.137
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.48
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.40
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.41
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.81
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.79
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.120
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.106
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.119
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.71
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.158
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.40
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.110
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.249
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.87
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.200
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.164
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.76
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.188
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.5
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.35
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.159
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.237
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.61
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.7
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.243
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.244
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.18
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.222
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.153
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.152
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.116
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.3
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.13
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.120
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.147
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.157
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.9
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.165
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.236
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.20
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.3
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.42
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.245
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.170
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.2
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.41
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.52
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.162
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.248
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.73
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.202
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.254
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.211
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.28
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.208
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.235

Es macht Folgendes:

  • It starts the following service:
    • TrustedInstaller
  • It accepts the following parameters:
    • -s 63389936 → required to continue to its routine
    • -a → compares the filename with “myapp.exe” to terminate and remove itself
    • -q
    • -w
    • svc
  • It DOES NOT continue to routine if User Default Language ID of the system is any of the following:
    • Russian (0x0419)
    • Armenia (0x042B)
    • Azerbaijan(Cyrillic) (0x082C)
    • Azerbaijan(Latin) (0x042C)
    • Belarus (0x0423)
    • Georgia (0x0437)
    • Kazakstan (0x043F)
    • Tajik(Cyrillic) (0x0428)
    • Turkmen (0x0442)
    • Uzbekistan(Cyrillic) (0x0843)
    • Uzbekistan(Latin) (0x0443)
  • It checks if the following virtual machine or sandbox related module(s) is loaded in the affected system:
    • avghooka.dll
    • avghookx.dll
    • sxin.dll
    • sf2.dll
    • sbiedll.dll
    • snxhk.dll
    • cmdvrt32.dll
    • cmdvrt64.dll
    • wpespy.dll
    • vmcheck.dll
    • pstorec.dll
    • dir_watch.dll
    • api_log.dll
    • dbghelp.dll
  • Enumerate all the files under C:\Windows\system32\drivers.
  • Find the substring of AV vendors under file properties of each driver.
  • Find the substring of AV vendors with file path.
  • It checks and compares the company name from the file properties if it has a substring of the following:
    • tanium
    • malwarebytes
    • emsisoft
    • elastic endpoint
    • trend micro
    • eset nod
    • carbonblack
    • mcafee
    • crowdstrike
    • cylance
    • fireeye
    • kaspersky
    • sentinelone
    • symantec
    • bitdefender
    • comodo
    • doctor web
    • f-secure
    • panda software
    • sophos
    • webroot
    • veeam
    • avast
    • acronis
    • aomei

  Solução

Mecanismo de varredura mínima: 9.800
Primeiro arquivo padrão VSAPI: 18.272.04
Data do lançamento do primeiro padrão VSAPI: 22 fevereiro 2023
VSAPI OPR Pattern Version: 18.273.00
VSAPI OPR Pattern veröffentlicht am: 23 fevereiro 2023

Step 2

Für Windows ME und XP Benutzer: Stellen Sie vor einer Suche sicher, dass die Systemwiederherstellung deaktiviert ist, damit der gesamte Computer durchsucht werden kann.

Step 3

<p> Beachten Sie, dass nicht alle Dateien, Ordner, Registrierungsschlüssel und Einträge auf Ihrem Computer installiert sind, während diese Malware / Spyware / Grayware ausgeführt wird. Dies kann auf eine unvollständige Installation oder andere Betriebssystembedingungen zurückzuführen sein. Fahren Sie mit dem nächsten Schritt fort. </ p><p> Beachten Sie, dass nicht alle Dateien, Ordner, Registrierungsschlüssel und Einträge auf Ihrem Computer installiert sind, während diese Malware / Spyware / Grayware ausgeführt wird. Dies kann auf eine unvollständige Installation oder andere Betriebssystembedingungen zurückzuführen sein. Fahren Sie mit dem nächsten Schritt fort. </ p>

Step 4

Diesen Registrierungswert löschen

[ Saber mais ]

Wichtig: Eine nicht ordnungsgemäße Bearbeitung der Windows Registrierung kann zu einer dauerhaften Fehlfunktion des Systems führen. Führen Sie diesen Schritt nur durch, wenn Sie mit der Vorgehensweise vertraut sind oder wenn Sie Ihren Systemadministrator um Unterstützung bitten können. Lesen Sie ansonsten zuerst diesen Microsoft Artikel, bevor Sie die Registrierung Ihres Computers ändern.

  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CLASSES\.blackbytent
    • (Default) = ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!
  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\.blackbytent\DefaultIcon
    • (Default) = n:\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico
  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
    • EnableLinkedConnections = 1
  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
    • LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy = 1
  • In HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
    • s1159 = BLACKBYTE
  • In HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
    • s2359 = BLACKBYTE

Step 5

Diese Datei suchen und löschen

[ Saber mais ]
Möglicherweise sind einige Komponentendateien verborgen. Aktivieren Sie unbedingt das Kontrollkästchen Versteckte Elemente durchsuchen unter Weitere erweiterte Optionen, um alle verborgenen Dateien und Ordner in den Suchergebnissen zu berücksichtigen.
  • %System Root%\SystemData\MsExchangeLog1.log
  • %System Root%\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico

Step 6

Diese Ordner suchen und löschen

[ Saber mais ]
Aktivieren Sie unbedingt das Kontrollkästchen Versteckte Elemente durchsuchen unter Weitere erweiterte Optionen, um alle verborgenen Ordner in den Suchergebnissen zu berücksichtigen.
  • %System Root%\SystemData

Step 7

Durchsuchen Sie Ihren Computer mit Ihrem Trend Micro Produkt, und löschen Sie Dateien, die als Ransom.Win64.BLACKBYTE.THBBBBC entdeckt werden. Falls die entdeckten Dateien bereits von Ihrem Trend Micro Produkt gesäubert, gelöscht oder in Quarantäne verschoben wurden, sind keine weiteren Schritte erforderlich. Dateien in Quarantäne können einfach gelöscht werden. Auf dieser Knowledge-Base-Seite finden Sie weitere Informationen.

Step 8

Restore this file from backup only Microsoft-related files will be restored. If this malware/grayware also deleted files related to programs that are not from Microsoft, please reinstall those programs on you computer again.

  • %Application Data%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\{Files}
  • %User Temp%\{Files}
  • %Temp%\{Files}

Step 9

Restore encrypted files from backup.


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