Analisado por: Jeffrey Francis Bonaobra   

 

Backdoor.Win32.Parazit.gen (KASPERSKY)

 Plataforma:

Windows

 Classificao do risco total:
 Potencial de dano:
 Potencial de distribuição:
 infecção relatada:
 Exposição das informações:
Baixo
Medium
Alto
Crítico

  • Tipo de grayware:
    Backdoor

  • Destrutivo:
    Não

  • Criptografado:
    Sim

  • In the Wild:
    Sim

  Visão geral

Canal de infecção: Aus dem Internet heruntergeladen, Fallen gelassen von anderer Malware

It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.

  Detalhes técnicos

Tipo de compactação: 2,752,512 bytes
Tipo de arquivo: Other
Residente na memória: Não
Data de recebimento das amostras iniciais: 05 julho 2022
Carga útil: Connects to URLs/IPs

Übertragungsdetails

It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.

Installation

Beendet sich selbst, wenn die folgenden Prozesse im Speicher des betroffenen Systems gefunden werden:

  • ollydbg.exe
  • ProcessHacker.exe
  • tcpview.exe
  • autoruns.exe
  • autorunsc.exe
  • filemon.exe
  • procmon.exe
  • regmon.exe
  • procexp.exe
  • idaq.exe
  • idaq64.exe
  • ImmunityDebugger.exe
  • Wireshark.exe
  • dumpcap.exe
  • HookExplorer.exe
  • ImportREC.exe
  • PETools.exe
  • LordPE.exe
  • SysInspector.exe
  • proc_analyzer.exe
  • sysAnalyzer.exe
  • sniff_hit.exe
  • windbg.exe
  • joeboxcontrol.exe
  • joeboxserver.exe
  • joeboxserver.exe
  • ResourceHacker.exe
  • x32dbg.exe
  • x64dbg.exe
  • Fiddler.exe
  • httpdebugger.exe

Andere Details

Es macht Folgendes:

  • It hooks APIs of the current process.
  • It terminates itself if it finds the following virtual machine/sandbox file artifacts in the affected system:
    • %System%\drivers\VBoxMouse.sys
    • %System%\drivers\VBoxGuest.sys
    • %System%\drivers\VBoxSF.sys
    • %System%\drivers\VBoxVideo.sys
    • %System%\vboxdisp.dll
    • %System%\vboxhook.dll
    • %System%\vboxmrxnp.dll
    • %System%\vboxogl.dll
    • %System%\vboxoglarrayspu.dll
    • %System%\vboxoglcrutil.dll
    • %System%\vboxoglerrorspu.dll
    • %System%\vboxoglfeedbackspu.dll
    • %System%\vboxoglpackspu.dll
    • %System%\vboxoglpassthroughspu.dll
    • %System%\vboxservice.exe
    • %System%\vboxtray.exe
    • %System%\VBoxControl.exe
    • %System%\drivers\balloon.sys
    • %System%\drivers\netkvm.sys
    • %System%\drivers\pvpanic.sys
    • %System%\drivers\viofs.sys
    • %System%\drivers\viogpudo.sys
    • %System%\drivers\vioinput.sys
    • %System%\drivers\viorng.sys
    • %System%\drivers\vioscsi.sys
    • %System%\drivers\vioser.sys
    • %System%\drivers\viostor.sys
  • It terminates itself if it finds the following virtual machine/sandbox directory artifacts in the affected system:
    • %Program Files%\oracle\virtualbox\guest additions
    • %Program Files%\qemu-ga
    • %Program Files%\SPICE Guest Tools
  • It terminates itself if it finds the following virtual machine/sandbox processes in the affected system's memory:
    • vboxservice.exe
    • vboxtray.exe
    • VMSrvc.exe
    • VMUSrvc.exe
    • qemu-ga.exe
    • vdagent.exe
    • vdservice.exe
    • prl_cc.exe
    • prl_tools.exe
  • It terminates itself if it finds the following virtual machine/sandbox network shares in the affected system:
    • VirtualBox Shared Folders
  • It terminates itself if it finds the following virtual devices in the affected system:
    • \.\VBoxMiniRdrDN
    • \.\VBoxGuest
    • \.\VBoxTrayIPC
    • \.\pipe\VBoxMiniRdDN
    • \.\pipe\VBoxTrayIPC
  • It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_NTEventLogFile entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
    • vboxvideo
    • VBoxVideoW8
    • VBoxWddm
  • It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_Bus entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
    • ACPIBus_BUS_0
    • PCI_BUS_0
    • PNP_BUS_0
  • It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_PnPEntity entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
    • PCI\VEN_80EE&DEV_CAFE
    • 82801FB
    • 82441FX
    • 82371SB
    • OpenHCD
  • It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_BaseBoard entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
    • VirtualBox
    • Oracle Corporation
  • It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_PnPDevice entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
    • VBOX
    • VEN_VBOX
  • It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_ComputerSystem entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
    • VirtualBox
    • HVM domU
    • VMWare
  • It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
    • 08:00:27
  • Based on analysis of the codes, this malware has the following capabilities:
    • Interprets the following messages as its backdoor commands:
      • shi/dij - inject malicious code into one the following target processes:
        • C:\Program Files\Windows Photo Viewer\ImagingDevices.exe
        • C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wab.exe
        • C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe
      • dex - write data into a file named wab.exe and executes it afterwards
      • sdl - delete itself from the infected system via the following command:
        • powershell Remove-Item -Path {File Path} -Force
      • ins - enables persistence by dropping a copy of itself and creating a VBS script that executes the malware copy
      • gdt - recursively delete itself from the infected system via the following command:
        • powershell Remove-Item -Path {File Path} -Force -Recurse

(Hinweis: %System% ist der Windows Systemordner. Er lautet in der Regel C:\Windows\System unter Windows 98 und ME, C:\WINNT\System32 unter Windows NT und 2000 sowie C:\Windows\System32 unter Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, Server 2003(32-bit), Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64bit) and 10(64-bit).. %Program Files%ist der Standardordner 'Programme', normalerweise C:\Programme.)

  Solução

Mecanismo de varredura mínima: 9.800
Primeiro arquivo padrão VSAPI: 17.674.03
Data do lançamento do primeiro padrão VSAPI: 08 julho 2022
VSAPI OPR Pattern Version: 17.675.00
VSAPI OPR Pattern veröffentlicht am: 09 julho 2022

Step 1

Für Windows ME und XP Benutzer: Stellen Sie vor einer Suche sicher, dass die Systemwiederherstellung deaktiviert ist, damit der gesamte Computer durchsucht werden kann.

Step 2

Durchsuchen Sie Ihren Computer mit Ihrem Trend Micro Produkt, und löschen Sie Dateien, die als Backdoor.Win64.BUMBLELOADER.A entdeckt werden. Falls die entdeckten Dateien bereits von Ihrem Trend Micro Produkt gesäubert, gelöscht oder in Quarantäne verschoben wurden, sind keine weiteren Schritte erforderlich. Dateien in Quarantäne können einfach gelöscht werden. Auf dieser Knowledge-Base-Seite finden Sie weitere Informationen.


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