Analysé par: Karl Dominguez   
 Modifié par: : Karl Dominguez

 Plate-forme:

iOS

 Overall Risk:
 Dommages potentiels: :
 Distribution potentielle: :
 reportedInfection:
Faible
Medium
Élevé
Critique

  • Type de grayware:
    Worm

  • Destructif:
    Non

  • Chiffrement:
    Non

  • In the wild::
    Oui

  Overview

Wird möglicherweise unwissentlich von einem Benutzer beim Besuch bösartiger Websites heruntergeladen. Wird möglicherweise manuell von einem Benutzer installiert.

  Détails techniques

File size: Varie
File type: Other
Memory resident: Non
Date de réception des premiers échantillons: 21 novembre 2009
Charge malveillante: Steals information; Executes scripts received from its C&C server

Übertragungsdetails

Wird möglicherweise unwissentlich von einem Benutzer beim Besuch bösartiger Websites heruntergeladen.

Wird möglicherweise manuell von einem Benutzer installiert.

Installation

Schleust die folgenden Dateien ein:

  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/cydia.tgz
    Description: This is the main malware archive which contains the files INST, DUH, SYSLOG, curl_7.19.4-6_iphoneos-arm.deb,com.apple.period.plist, and com.apple.ksyslog.plist
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/.tmp
    Description: This is the file where /private/var/mobile/home/syslog stores received raw data from its command and control (C&C) server
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/sshd
    Description: Trend Micro detects this malicious executable as IOS_IKEE.A. It scans for IP addresses into which it will propagate to. It propagates by logging into the target iPhone via SSH using the default password, "alpine". It creates the folder, /private/var/mobile/home/, where it copies the malware package, CYDIA.TGZ. It then executes /private/var/mobile/home/inst to install the malware package.
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/duh
    Description: This is the malicious binary file used by this malware to issue HTTP GET commands. This is executed by /private/var/mobile/home/syslog to receive data from its C&C server.
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/inst
    Description: Trend Micro detects this malicious script as IOS_IKEE.A. It generates an ID for the infected iPhone which can be used as an identifier when this script connects to its C&C server. The generated ID is saved in /etc/rel. It then copies com.apple.ksyslog.plist to /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.ksyslog.plist so that this script executes every time the infected device is turned on. In addition, it installs legitimate Debian packages necessary for its routines. It also changes the default SSH password, alpine that is saved in /etc/master.passwd to ohshit. This file is responsible for gathering all SMS messages and information about the infected device. SMS messages are saved in /private/var/mobile/home/{ID}/sms.txt while phone information are saved into /private/var/mobile/home/{ID}/info. It then archives the folder, /private/var/mobile/home/{ID}, and connects to its C&C server, {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.38.16/xml/a.php?name={ID} to send the .TGZ file in base64 format.
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/heh
    Description: This file is where /private/var/mobile/home/syslog saves shell scripts to be executed.
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/syslog
    Description: Trend Micro detects this malicious script as IOS_IKEE.A. This file runs /private/var/mobile/home/duh and saves the C&C server replies to /private/var/mobile/home/.tmp. It parses the .TMP file for scripts then saves the result in /private/var/mobile/home/heh and executes this file as a shell script.
  • File name: /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.ksyslog.plist
    Description: This daemon (a software that runs in the background) executes /private/var/mobile/home/sshd every time the infected iPhone device is started and keeps it running.
  • File name: /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.period.plist
    Description: This daemon executes /private/var/mobile/home/syslog every 300 seconds.
  • File name: /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.periodic.plist
    Description: This daemon file executes /private/var/mobile/home/syslog every 2000 seconds.
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/adv-cmds_119-5_iphoneos-arm.deb
    Description: This legitimate Debian package needed by this worm to execute its commands.
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/sqlite3_3.5.9-9_iphoneos-arm.deb
    Description: This is a legitimate Debian package file for an SQL database.
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/curl_7.19.4-6_iphoneos-arm.deb
    Description: This is a legitimate Debian package for Curl that is used to download and install adv-cmds_119-5_iphoneos-arm.deb and sqlite3_3.5.9-9_iphoneos-arm.deb from saurik.com.
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/{ID}/sms.txt
    Description: This file contains the stolen text messages.
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/{ID}/info
    Description: This file is where stolen data, such as the infected iPhone's name, version, and network interface information, is saved.
  • File name: /private/var/mobile/home/{ID}.tgz
    Description: This is an archive file containing files inside /private/var/mobile/home/{ID}/ that is sent to the C&C by /private/var/mobile/home/inst in base64 format.
  • File name: /etc/rel
    Description: This file contains the generated ID

Erstellt die folgenden Ordner:

  • /private/var/mobile/home
  • /private/var/mobile/home/{ID}

  Solutions

Moteur de scan minimum: 8.900

Step 1

Für Windows ME und XP Benutzer: Stellen Sie vor einer Suche sicher, dass die Systemwiederherstellung deaktiviert ist, damit der gesamte Computer durchsucht werden kann.

Step 2

Durchsuchen Sie Ihren Computer mit Ihrem Trend Micro Produkt, und löschen Sie Dateien, die als IOS_IKEE.A entdeckt werden. Falls die entdeckten Dateien bereits von Ihrem Trend Micro Produkt gesäubert, gelöscht oder in Quarantäne verschoben wurden, sind keine weiteren Schritte erforderlich. Dateien in Quarantäne können einfach gelöscht werden. Auf dieser Knowledge-Base-Seite finden Sie weitere Informationen.


Participez à notre enquête!