WORM_DORKBOT.MVI

This worm monitors the Internet activities of the infected system to steal user credentials if the user visits websites with certain strings. It attempts to steal user credentials used in the certain websites. It monitors certain browsers. It has backdoor capabilities. It modifies the following system files. It hooks the following API to hide itself and to aid its routines.

It drops shortcut files pointing to the copy of itself in removable drives. These dropped .LNK files use the names of the folders located on the said drives for their file names. It then sets the attributes of the original folders to Hidden to trick the user into clicking the .LNK files.

This worm executes commands from a remote malicious user, effectively compromising the affected system.

It prevents users from visiting antivirus-related websites that contain specific strings.

Arrival Details

This malware arrives via the following means:

• It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.
• It arrives via removable drives.
• It may arrive through accessing malicious IFRAME tags inserted in HTML pages.
• It arrives via Instant Messaging applications and social networking sites.

Installation

This worm drops the following copies of itself into the affected system:

• %Application Data%\Microsoft\Windows\{Random Filename 1}.exe
• %Application Data%\WindowsUpdate\Updater.exe
• %Application Data%\c731200

(Note: %Application Data% is the Application Data folder, where it usually is C:\Documents and Settings\{user name}\Application Data on Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, and Windows XP (32- and 64-bit); C:\Users\{user name}\AppData\Roaming on Windows Vista (32- and 64-bit), Windows 7 (32- and 64-bit), Windows 8 (32- and 64-bit), Windows 8.1 (32- and 64-bit), Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2012.)

It drops the following component file(s):

• %User Temp%\c731200

(Note: %User Temp% is the user's temporary folder, where it usually is C:\Documents and Settings\{user name}\Local Settings\Temp on Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, and Windows XP (32- and 64-bit); C:\Users\{user name}\AppData\Local\Temp on Windows Vista (32- and 64-bit), Windows 7 (32- and 64-bit), Windows 8 (32- and 64-bit), Windows 8.1 (32- and 64-bit), Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2012.)

It adds the following mutexes to ensure that only one of its copies runs at any one time:

• -9caf4c3fMutex

Autostart Technique

This worm adds the following registry entries to enable its automatic execution at every system startup:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Windows Update Installer = “%Application Data%\WindowsUpdate\Updater.exe”

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Windows Update = “{Malware Path}\{Malware Filename}.exe”

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
{Random Filename 1} = "%Application Data%\Microsoft\Windows\{Random Filename 1}.exe”

Propagation

This worm drops the following copy(ies) of itself in all removable drives:

• {Removable Drive Letter}:\{Random Filename 2}.scr

It sends messages that contain links to sites hosting remote copies of itself using the following instant-messaging (IM) applications:

• Pidgin
• Windows Live Messenger
• MSN Messenger
• Windows Messenger

Backdoor Routine

This worm executes the following commands from a remote malicious user:

• Join an IRC channel
• Send private messages on IRC channel joined
• Update self
• Download arbitrary files
• Send MSN Messenger messages
• Insert iframe tags into HTML files
• Visit arbitrary website
• Block arbitrary DNS
• Steal login credentials
• Log in to FTP sites
• Create arbitrary processes
• Can modifies the following system files:
  • ipconfig.exe
  • verclsid.exe
  • regedit.exe
  • rundll32.exe
  • cmd.exe
  • regsvr32.exe
• Perform DDOS attack

Other Details

This worm connects to the following URL(s) to get the affected system's IP address:

• api.wipmania.com

It does the following:

• Deletes all existing registries values located in:
  • HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
• This worm monitors the Internet activities of the infected system to steal user credentials if the user visits websites with the following strings:
  
  • login[password]
  • login[username]
  • *members*.iknowthatgirl*/members*
  • *youporn.*/login*
  • *members.brazzers.com*
  • numeroTarjeta
  • *clave=*
  • *bcointernacional*login*
  • *:2222/CMD_LOGIN*
  • *whcms*dologin*
  • *:2086/login*
  • *:2083/login*
  • *:2082/login*
  • *webnames.ru/*user_login*
  • *dotster.com/*login*
  • loginid
  • *enom.com/login*
  • login.Pass
  • login.User
  • *login.Pass=*
  • *1and1.com/xml/config*
  • token
  • *moniker.com/*Login*
  • LoginPassword
  • LoginUserName
  • *LoginPassword=*
  • *namecheap.com/*login*
  • loginname
  • *godaddy.com/login*
  • Password
  • EmailName
  • *Password=*
  • *alertpay.com/login*
  • *netflix.com/*ogin*
  • *thepiratebay.org/login*
  • *torrentleech.org/*login*
  • *vip-file.com/*/signin-do*
  • *pas=*
  • *sms4file.com/*/signin-do*
  • *letitbit.net*
  • *what.cd/login*
  • *oron.com/login*
  • *filesonic.com/*login*
  • *speedyshare.com/login*
  • *pw=*
  • *uploaded.to/*login*
  • *uploading.com/*login*
  • loginUserPassword
  • loginUserName
  • *loginUserPassword=*
  • *fileserv.com/login*
  • *hotfile.com/login*
  • *4shared.com/login*
  • txtpass
  • txtuser
  • *txtpass=*
  • *netload.in/index*
  • *freakshare.com/login*
  • login_pass
  • *login_pass=*
  • *mediafire.com/*login*
  • *sendspace.com/login*
  • *megaupload.*/*login*
  • *depositfiles.*/*/login*
  • userid
  • *signin.ebay*SignIn
  • *officebanking.cl/*login.asp*
  • *secure.logmein.*/*logincheck*
  • session[password]
  • session[username_or_email]
  • *password]=*
  • *twitter.com/sessions
  • txtPassword
  • txtEmail
  • *&txtPassword=*
  • *.moneybookers.*/*login.pl
  • *runescape*/*weblogin*
  • *dyndns*/account*
  • *&password=*
  • *no-ip*/login*
  • *steampowered*/login*
  • quick_password
  • quick_username
  • username
  • *hackforums.*/member.php
  • email
  • *facebook.*/login.php*
  • *login.yahoo.*/*login*
  • passwd
  • login
  • *passwd=*
  • *login.live.*/*post.srf*
  • TextfieldPassword
  • TextfieldEmail
  • *TextfieldPassword=*
  • *gmx.*/*FormLogin*
  • *Passwd=*
  • FLN-Password
  • FLN-UserName
  • *FLN-Password=*
  • *fastmail.*/mail/*
  • *pass=*
  • *bigstring.*/*index.php*
  • screenname
  • *screenname.aol.*/login.psp*
  • password
  • loginId
  • *password=*
  • *aol.*/*login.psp*
  • Passwd
  • Email
  • *service=youtube*
  • *google.*/*ServiceLoginAuth*
  • login_password
  • login_email
  • *login_password=*
  • *paypal.*/webscr?cmd=_login-submit*
  
  
• This worm monitors and captures messages posted on comment boxes on websites with the following URL strings:
  
  • comment-text
  • *bebo.*/c/home/ajax_post_lifestream_comment
  • bebo Lifestream
  • *bebo.*/c/profile/comment_post.json
  • bebo Comment
  • Message
  • *bebo.*/mail/MailCompose.jsp*
  • bebo Message
  • *friendster.*/sendmessage.php*
  • Friendster Message
  • comment
  • Friendster Comment
  • shoutout
  • *friendster.*/rpc.php
  • Friendster Shoutout
  • *vkontakte.ru/mail.php
  • vkontakte Message
  • *vkontakte.ru/wall.php
  • vkontakte Wall
  • message
  • *vkontakte.ru/api.php
  • vkontakte Chat
  • *twitter.*/*direct_messages/new*
  • Twitter Message
  • *twitter.*/*status*/update*
  • Twitter Tweet
  • status
  • *facebook.*/ajax/*MessageComposerEndpoint.php*
  • Facebook Message
  • msg_text
  • *facebook.*/ajax/chat/send.php*
  • Facebook IM
  
  
• It drops shortcut files pointing to the copy of itself in removable drives. These dropped .LNK files use the names of the folders and files (except .exe files) located on the said drives for their file names. It then sets the attributes of the original folders to Hidden to trick the user into clicking the .LNK files.
• It monitors the following browsers:
  
  • Flock
  • Opera
  • Google Chrome
  • Internet Explorer
  • Mozilla Firefox
  
  
• It is injected into all running processes (except smss.exe and lsass.exe) to remain memory resident.

It prevents users from visiting antivirus-related websites that contain the following strings:

• webroot
• fortinet
• virusbuster
• nprotect
• gdatasoftware
• virus
• precisesecurity
• lavasoft
• heck.tc
• emsisoft
• onlinemalwarescanner
• onecare.live
• f-secure
• bullguard
• clamav
• pandasecurity
• sophos
• malwarebytes
• sunbeltsoftware
• norton
• norman
• mcafee
• symantec
• comodo
• avast
• avira
• bitdefender
• eset
• kaspersky
• trendmicro
• iseclab
• virscan
• garyshood
• viruschief
• jotti
• threatexpert
• novirusthanks
• virustotal
• avg

NOTES:

It connects to the following URL(s) to send and receive commands from a remote malicious user:

• {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.118.242:3721
• {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.58.66:3721
• {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.59.172:3721
• s.{BLOCKED}pzz.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}rgo.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ijy.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}lsr.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}alt.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}iji.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}xyr.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}gux.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}jzr.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}kjl.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}tqr.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}wrg.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ijt.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}vhp.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}nzj.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}cnk.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}vog.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}woi.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}fgx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zwi.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}wml.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ppl.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}mwu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}cqa.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qqc.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}lmx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}tsl.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}vcw.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}rgx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}cpa.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}fhg.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}iog.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zqs.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}eks.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}yms.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ytm.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}fkv.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}awu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}cux.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}axx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}jty.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}awy.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}wqh.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ols.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}enx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}pxo.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}bsq.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}llx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}hla.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}mof.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zll.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}fve.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}oih.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}xvh.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}vic.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}jmx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qbe.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}cok.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}xvt.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}roi.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qqz.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}nhq.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}cro.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}bhv.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qpu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qag.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}kqp.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}xch.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}tkr.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zso.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}eqo.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}kwc.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}npc.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}hii.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zts.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ofj.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ekx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}nfw.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}evg.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}kjv.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}uax.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}phs.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}eqc.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ooe.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ubv.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}mus.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}nak.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}guk.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}gsi.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}tmh.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ybh.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}szh.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}kyp.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}xvj.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ynj.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}nni.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}tzs.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}kbp.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}lfh.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zff.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ekj.com
• s.{BLOCKED}lka.com
• s.{BLOCKED}rvx.com
• s.{BLOCKED}rbo.com
• s.{BLOCKED}faa.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ehc.com
• s.{BLOCKED}psx.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ajj.com
• s.{BLOCKED}lne.com
• s.{BLOCKED}san.com
• s.{BLOCKED}snu.com
• s.{BLOCKED}rym.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ybl.com
• s.{BLOCKED}vue.com
• s.{BLOCKED}lxx.com
• s.{BLOCKED}nhe.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ckv.com
• s.{BLOCKED}tsr.com
• s.{BLOCKED}lao.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ixy.com
• s.{BLOCKED}jec.com
• s.{BLOCKED}qpk.com
• s.{BLOCKED}zju.com
• s.{BLOCKED}icu.com
• s.{BLOCKED}obb.com
• s.{BLOCKED}nup.com
• s.{BLOCKED}fal.com
• s.{BLOCKED}flu.com
• s.{BLOCKED}umn.com
• s.{BLOCKED}svi.com
• s.{BLOCKED}npc.com
• s.{BLOCKED}llw.com
• s.{BLOCKED}jtm.com
• s.{BLOCKED}cjr.com
• s.{BLOCKED}tva.com
• s.{BLOCKED}xlp.com
• s.{BLOCKED}zsv.com
• s.{BLOCKED}gcc.com
• s.{BLOCKED}cfp.com
• s.{BLOCKED}bak.com
• s.{BLOCKED}umn.com
• s.{BLOCKED}iix.com
• s.{BLOCKED}omj.com
• s.{BLOCKED}hqf.com
• s.{BLOCKED}lgi.com
• s.{BLOCKED}vqw.com
• s.{BLOCKED}eiu.com
• s.{BLOCKED}wgp.com
• s.{BLOCKED}hjn.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ooj.com
• s.{BLOCKED}nua.com
• s.{BLOCKED}fus.com
• s.{BLOCKED}pes.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ghx.com
• s.{BLOCKED}uwu.com
• s.{BLOCKED}hyy.com
• s.{BLOCKED}fxr.com
• s.{BLOCKED}efr.com
• s.{BLOCKED}sbw.com
• s.{BLOCKED}msu.com
• s.{BLOCKED}bbc.com
• s.{BLOCKED}azn.com
• s.{BLOCKED}olu.com
• s.{BLOCKED}jcs.com
• s.{BLOCKED}xoc.com
• s.{BLOCKED}opn.com
• s.{BLOCKED}iyh.com
• s.{BLOCKED}hwn.com
• s.{BLOCKED}jyo.com
• s.{BLOCKED}juc.com
• s.{BLOCKED}oco.com
• s.{BLOCKED}kbs.com
• s.{BLOCKED}cxy.com
• s.{BLOCKED}kww.com
• s.{BLOCKED}tcb.com
• s.{BLOCKED}fho.com
• s.{BLOCKED}iag.com
• s.{BLOCKED}zcz.com
• s.{BLOCKED}isk.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ylg.com
• s.{BLOCKED}yow.com
• s.{BLOCKED}vjj.com
• s.{BLOCKED}los.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ita.com
• s.{BLOCKED}yna.com
• s.{BLOCKED}epz.com
• s.{BLOCKED}yqw.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ylf.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ijo.com
• s.{BLOCKED}ujw.com
• s.{BLOCKED}mkg.com
• s.{BLOCKED}zpj.com
• s.{BLOCKED}kxs.com
• s.{BLOCKED}uxp.com
• s.{BLOCKED}kth.com
• s.{BLOCKED}uhp.com
• s.{BLOCKED}eev.com
• s.{BLOCKED}qbg.com
• s.{BLOCKED}kcm.com
• s.{BLOCKED}iuz.com
• s.{BLOCKED}kr.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ru.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}yn.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}is.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}cu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}kx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zm.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}fk.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}tn.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}uy.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}uu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}mh.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}wt.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ch.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}lq.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}cb.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}yc.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}pe.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}nz.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}fu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}bc.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ng.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}jz.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}to.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ja.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zt.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}hr.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}fl.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}go.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}mh.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ju.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}mu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}jm.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}gj.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}az.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}mv.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}rk.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ho.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}nx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}kc.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}gu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zc.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ia.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}xm.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zt.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}pq.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}mu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ny.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ns.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ah.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ec.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}fl.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}yl.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}wx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ra.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}lx.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}yn.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ab.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}uq.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ez.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}co.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ne.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}sy.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}of.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}lf.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}fy.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}mt.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ob.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ep.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}as.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ka.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}wi.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qp.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zv.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}pu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ag.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}en.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}er.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}jy.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}rn.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qa.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ih.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qv.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}rl.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}xa.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}eb.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}vs.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ah.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}fw.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}bt.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qo.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}hv.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ks.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}cu.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}qi.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}zo.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}ln.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}et.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}m.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}t.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}k.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}h.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}k.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}g.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}m.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}w.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}y.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}u.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}y.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}e.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}r.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}k.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}c.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}r.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}g.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}q.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}o.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}f.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}c.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}i.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}p.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}r.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}g.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}q.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}v.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}c.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}m.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}v.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}e.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}q.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}o.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}t.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}i.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}k.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}u.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}t.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}z.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}k.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}q.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}k.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}u.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}l.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}g.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}j.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}g.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}r.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}f.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}h.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}e.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}y.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}m.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}p.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}q.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}j.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}r.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}z.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}z.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}f.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}u.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}h.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}k.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}u.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}m.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}i.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}j.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}r.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}i.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}c.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}l.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}f.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}c.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}m.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}j.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}l.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}e.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}q.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}f.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}c.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}f.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}j.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}q.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}q.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}g.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}y.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}f.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}w.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}p.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}o.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}v.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}v.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}y.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}h.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}f.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}r.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}g.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}c.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}j.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}p.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}e.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}j.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}r.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}j.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}f.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}t.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}j.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}r.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}v.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}k.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}m.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}y.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}v.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}p.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}x.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}m.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}f.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}v.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}s.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}e.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}q.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}q.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}k.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}r.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}j.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}z.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}z.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}t.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}z.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}g.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}a.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}m.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}g.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}p.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}c.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}k.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}w.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}p.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}b.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}o.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}n.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}u.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}o.ru
• s.{BLOCKED}bh.ru

It does not have rootkit capabilities.

It does not exploit any vulnerability.