Analysis by: Kim Benedict Victorio
ALIASES:

Win64:Malware-gen (AVAST)

 PLATFORM:

Windows

 OVERALL RISK RATING:
 DAMAGE POTENTIAL:
 DISTRIBUTION POTENTIAL:
 REPORTED INFECTION:
 INFORMATION EXPOSURE:

  • Threat Type: Ransomware

  • Destructiveness: No

  • Encrypted: No

  • In the wild: Yes

  OVERVIEW

Infection Channel: Dropped by other malware

This Ransomware arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.

It deletes files in certain folders, disabling programs and applications from properly running.

It drops files as ransom note. It avoids encrypting files with the following file extensions.

  TECHNICAL DETAILS

File Size: 663,424 bytes
File Type: EXE
Memory Resident: No
Initial Samples Received Date: 22 Feb 2023
Payload: Drops files, Deletes files, Modifies system registry, Terminates processes, Disables AV, Connects to URLs/IPs

Arrival Details

This Ransomware arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.

Installation

This Ransomware drops the following files:

  • %System Root%\SystemData\MsExchangeLog1.log
  • %System Root%\SystemData\t8bjd27 (delete after)
  • %System Root%\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico

(Note: %System Root% is the Windows root folder, where it usually is C:\ on all Windows operating system versions.)

It adds the following processes:

  • %System&\svchost.exe -s 63389936
  • /c ping 1 1 1 -n 10 > Nul & fsutil file setZeroData offset=0 length=663424 "{Malware Path}{Malware Name}" & Del {Malware Path}{Malware Name} /F /Q
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k NetworkService
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k LocalService
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k regsvc

(Note: %System% is the Windows system folder, where it usually is C:\Windows\System32 on all Windows operating system versions.)

It creates the following folders:

  • %System Root%\SystemData

(Note: %System Root% is the Windows root folder, where it usually is C:\ on all Windows operating system versions.)

It adds the following mutexes to ensure that only one of its copies runs at any one time:

  • Global\d844900fbb575e14e52e60f2dbacaed8be2ed9effa9d82c84e86fee2e4d24d53

It injects codes into the following process(es):

  • %System&\svchost.exe -s 63389936

Other System Modifications

This Ransomware deletes files in the following folders:

  • %Application Data%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\
  • %User Temp%
  • %Temp%

(Note: %Application Data% is the current user's Application Data folder, which is usually C:\Documents and Settings\{user name}\Application Data on Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, and Server 2003(32-bit), or C:\Users\{user name}\AppData\Roaming on Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit) and 10(64-bit).. %User Temp% is the current user's Temp folder, which is usually C:\Documents and Settings\{user name}\Local Settings\Temp on Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, and Server 2003(32-bit), or C:\Users\{user name}\AppData\Local\Temp on Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit) and 10(64-bit).. %Temp% is the Windows temporary folder, where it usually is C:\Windows\Temp on all Windows operating system versions.)

It adds the following registry entries:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CLASSES\
.blackbytent
(Default) = ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\
.blackbytent\DefaultIcon
(Default) = n:\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\
System
EnableLinkedConnections = 1

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\
System
LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy = 1

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
s1159 = BLACKBYTE

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
s2359 = BLACKBYTE

It deletes the following registry keys:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
vssadmin.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
wbadmin.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
bcdedit.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
powershell.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
diskshadow.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
net.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
taskkill.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
wmic.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
fsutil.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Raccine

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\
Services\EventLog\Application\
Raccine

HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-2272379601-2892648605-4202271867-1000\SOFTWARE\
Raccine

HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-2272379601-2892648605-4202271867-1000\SOFTWARE\
Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
Run\Raccine Tray

Propagation

This Ransomware uses the following user name and password to gain access to password-protected shares:

  • username: {company name}\administrator
  • password: P@$$w0rd

Process Termination

This Ransomware terminates the following services if found on the affected system:

  • CybereasonRansomFree
  • vnetd
  • bpcd
  • TeraCopyService
  • msftesql
  • nsService
  • klvssbridge64
  • vapiendpoint
  • ShMonitor
  • Smcinst
  • SmcService
  • SntpService
  • svcGenericHost
  • swi_
  • TmCCSF
  • tmlisten
  • TrueKey
  • TrueKeyScheduler
  • TrueKeyServiceHelper
  • WRSVC,McTaskManager
  • OracleClientCache80
  • mfefire
  • wbengine
  • mfemms
  • RESvc
  • mfevtp
  • sacsvr
  • SAVAdminService
  • SAVService
  • SepMasterService
  • PDVFSService
  • ESHASRV
  • SDRSVC
  • FA_Scheduler
  • KAVFS
  • KAVFSGT
  • kavfsslp
  • klnagent
  • macmnsvc
  • masvc
  • MBAMService
  • MBEndpointAgent
  • McShield
  • Antivirus
  • AVP
  • DCAgent
  • bedbg
  • EhttpSrv
  • MMS
  • ekrn
  • EPSecurityService
  • EPUpdateService
  • ntrtscan
  • EsgShKernel
  • msexchangeadtopology
  • AcrSch2Svc
  • MSOLAP$TPSAMA
  • Intel(R) PROSet Monitoring
  • msexchangeimap4
  • ARSM
  • unistoresvc_1af40a
  • ReportServer$TPS
  • MSOLAP$SYSTEM_BGC
  • W3Svc
  • MSExchangeSRS
  • ReportServer$TPSAMA
  • Zoolz 2 Service
  • MSOLAP$TPS
  • aphidmonitorservice
  • SstpSvc
  • MSExchangeMTA
  • ReportServer$SYSTEM_BGC
  • Symantec System Recovery
  • UI0Detect
  • MSExchangeSA
  • MSExchangeIS
  • ReportServer
  • MsDtsServer110
  • POP3Svc
  • MSExchangeMGMT
  • SMTPSvc
  • MsDtsServer
  • IisAdmin
  • MSExchangeES
  • EraserSvc11710
  • Enterprise Client Service
  • MsDtsServer100
  • NetMsmqActivator
  • stc_raw_agent
  • VSNAPVSS
  • PDVFSService
  • AcrSch2Svc
  • Acronis
  • CASAD2DWebSvc
  • CAARCUpdateSvc
  • McAfee
  • avpsus
  • DLPAgentService
  • mfewc
  • BMR Boot Service
  • DefWatch
  • ccEvtMgr
  • ccSetMgr
  • SavRoam
  • RTVscan
  • QBFCService
  • QBIDPService
  • IntuitQuickBooksFCS
  • QBCFMonitorService
  • YooIT
  • zhudongfangyu
  • raccine
  • cylance
  • screenconnect
  • ransom
  • sqltelemetry
  • msexch
  • vnc
  • teamviewer
  • msolap
  • veeam
  • backup
  • sql
  • memtas
  • vss
  • sophos
  • svc$
  • mepocs

It terminates the following processes if found running in the affected system's memory:

  • teracopy
  • nsservice
  • nsctrl
  • uranium
  • processhacker
  • procmon
  • pestudio
  • procmon64
  • x32dbg
  • x64dbg
  • cff explorer
  • procexp
  • pslist
  • tcpview
  • tcpvcon
  • dbgview
  • rammap
  • rammap64
  • vmmap
  • ollydbg
  • autoruns
  • autorunsc
  • filemon
  • regmon
  • idaq
  • idaq64
  • immunitydebugger
  • wireshark
  • dumpcap
  • hookexplorer
  • importrec
  • petools
  • lordpe
  • sysinspector
  • proc_analyzer
  • sysanalyzer
  • sniff_hit
  • windbg
  • joeboxcontrol
  • joeboxserver
  • joeboxserver
  • resourcehacker
  • fiddler
  • httpdebugger
  • dumpit
  • rammap
  • rammap64
  • vmmap
  • agntsvc
  • cntaosmgr
  • dbeng50
  • dbsnmp
  • encsvc
  • infopath
  • isqlplussvc
  • mbamtray
  • msaccess
  • msftesql
  • mspub
  • mydesktopqos
  • mydesktopservice
  • mysqld
  • mysqld-nt
  • mysqld-opt
  • Ntrtscan
  • ocautoupds
  • ocomm
  • ocssd
  • onenote
  • oracle
  • outlook
  • PccNTMon
  • powerpnt
  • sqbcoreservice
  • sql
  • sqlagent
  • sqlbrowser
  • sqlservr
  • sqlwriter
  • steam
  • synctime
  • tbirdconfig
  • thebat
  • thebat64
  • thunderbird
  • tmlisten
  • visio
  • winword
  • wordpad
  • xfssvccon
  • zoolz

Other Details

This Ransomware connects to the following possibly malicious URL:

  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.150
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.248
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.136
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.135
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.154
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.22
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.101
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.253
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.97
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.169
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.192
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.24
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.100
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.105
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.208
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.136
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.213
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.216
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.218
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.225
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.160
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.152
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.5
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.6
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.38
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.235
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.11
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.9
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.85
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.143
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.211
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.4
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.116
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.96
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.174
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.201
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.13
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.9
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.12
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.7
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.10
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.28
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.175
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.126
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.166
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.110
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.5
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.156
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.10
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.34
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.35
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.8
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.71
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.95
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.236
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.54
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.128
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.25
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.95
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.150
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.28
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.141
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.180
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.1
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.8
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.64
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.203
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.131
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.217
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.3
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.2
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.71
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.241
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.4
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.4
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.249
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.5
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.3
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.3
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.170
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.2
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.248
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  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.28
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.208
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.235

It does the following:

  • It starts the following service:
    • TrustedInstaller
  • It accepts the following parameters:
    • -s 63389936 → required to continue to its routine
    • -a → compares the filename with “myapp.exe” to terminate and remove itself
    • -q
    • -w
    • svc
  • It DOES NOT continue to routine if User Default Language ID of the system is any of the following:
    • Russian (0x0419)
    • Armenia (0x042B)
    • Azerbaijan(Cyrillic) (0x082C)
    • Azerbaijan(Latin) (0x042C)
    • Belarus (0x0423)
    • Georgia (0x0437)
    • Kazakstan (0x043F)
    • Tajik(Cyrillic) (0x0428)
    • Turkmen (0x0442)
    • Uzbekistan(Cyrillic) (0x0843)
    • Uzbekistan(Latin) (0x0443)
  • It checks if the following virtual machine or sandbox related module(s) is loaded in the affected system:
    • avghooka.dll
    • avghookx.dll
    • sxin.dll
    • sf2.dll
    • sbiedll.dll
    • snxhk.dll
    • cmdvrt32.dll
    • cmdvrt64.dll
    • wpespy.dll
    • vmcheck.dll
    • pstorec.dll
    • dir_watch.dll
    • api_log.dll
    • dbghelp.dll
  • Enumerate all the files under C:\Windows\system32\drivers.
  • Find the substring of AV vendors under file properties of each driver.
  • Find the substring of AV vendors with file path.
  • It checks and compares the company name from the file properties if it has a substring of the following:
    • tanium
    • malwarebytes
    • emsisoft
    • elastic endpoint
    • trend micro
    • eset nod
    • carbonblack
    • mcafee
    • crowdstrike
    • cylance
    • fireeye
    • kaspersky
    • sentinelone
    • symantec
    • bitdefender
    • comodo
    • doctor web
    • f-secure
    • panda software
    • sophos
    • webroot
    • veeam
    • avast
    • acronis
    • aomei

Ransomware Routine

This Ransomware avoids encrypting files with the following strings in their file name:

  • bootnxt
  • ntldr
  • bootmgr
  • thumbs.db
  • ntuser.dat
  • bootsect.bak
  • autoexec.bat
  • iconcache.db
  • bootfont.bin

It avoids encrypting files with the following strings in their file path:

  • systemdata
  • windows
  • boot
  • program files
  • program files (x86)
  • windowsold
  • programdata
  • intel
  • bitdefender
  • trend micro
  • windowsapps
  • appdata
  • application data
  • system volume information
  • perflogs
  • msocache

It renames encrypted files using the following names:

  • {Encoded base64}.blackbytent

It drops the following file(s) as ransom note:

  • {Encrypted Directory}\BB_Readme_CDXNB8WC.txt
    BlackByte ransom note

It avoids encrypting files with the following file extensions:

  • .mui
  • .log1
  • .search-ms
  • .ini
  • .url
  • .msilog
  • .log
  • .ldf
  • .lock
  • .theme
  • .msi
  • .sys
  • .wpx
  • .cpl
  • .adv
  • .msc
  • .scr
  • .key
  • .ico
  • .dll
  • .hta
  • .deskthemepack
  • .nomedia
  • .msu
  • .rtp
  • .msp
  • .idx
  • .ani
  • .386
  • .diagcfg
  • .bin
  • .mod
  • .ics
  • .com
  • .hlp
  • .spl
  • .nls
  • .cab
  • .exe
  • .diagpkg
  • .icl
  • .ocx
  • .rom
  • .prf
  • .themepack
  • .msstyles
  • .icns
  • .mpa
  • .drv
  • .cur
  • .diagcab
  • .cmd
  • .shs

  SOLUTION

Minimum Scan Engine: 9.800
FIRST VSAPI PATTERN FILE: 18.272.04
FIRST VSAPI PATTERN DATE: 22 Feb 2023
VSAPI OPR PATTERN File: 18.273.00
VSAPI OPR PATTERN Date: 23 Feb 2023

Step 1

Trend Micro Predictive Machine Learning detects and blocks malware at the first sign of its existence, before it executes on your system. When enabled, your Trend Micro product detects this malware under the following machine learning name:

    • Ransom.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF066E0002 (GENERIC: Hit Bad Auto Shield)

Step 2

Before doing any scans, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows 10 users must disable System Restore to allow full scanning of their computers.

Step 3

Note that not all files, folders, and registry keys and entries are installed on your computer during this malware's/spyware's/grayware's execution. This may be due to incomplete installation or other operating system conditions. If you do not find the same files/folders/registry information, please proceed to the next step.

Step 4

Delete this registry value

[ Learn More ]

Important: Editing the Windows Registry incorrectly can lead to irreversible system malfunction. Please do this step only if you know how or you can ask assistance from your system administrator. Else, check this Microsoft article first before modifying your computer's registry.

  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CLASSES\.blackbytent
    • (Default) = ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!
  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\.blackbytent\DefaultIcon
    • (Default) = n:\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico
  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
    • EnableLinkedConnections = 1
  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
    • LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy = 1
  • In HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
    • s1159 = BLACKBYTE
  • In HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
    • s2359 = BLACKBYTE

Step 5

Search and delete this file

[ Learn More ]
There may be some files that are hidden. Please make sure you check the Search Hidden Files and Folders checkbox in the "More advanced options" option to include all hidden files and folders in the search result.
  • %System Root%\SystemData\MsExchangeLog1.log
  • %System Root%\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico

Step 6

Search and delete these folders

[ Learn More ]
Please make sure you check the Search Hidden Files and Folders checkbox in the More advanced options option to include all hidden folders in the search result.
  • %System Root%\SystemData

Step 7

Scan your computer with your Trend Micro product to delete files detected as Ransom.Win64.BLACKBYTE.THBBBBC. If the detected files have already been cleaned, deleted, or quarantined by your Trend Micro product, no further step is required. You may opt to simply delete the quarantined files. Please check the following Trend Micro Support pages for more information:

Step 8

Restore this file from backup only Microsoft-related files will be restored. If this malware/grayware also deleted files related to programs that are not from Microsoft, please reinstall those programs on you computer again.

  • %Application Data%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\{Files}
  • %User Temp%\{Files}
  • %Temp%\{Files}

Step 9

Restore encrypted files from backup.


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