Backdoor.Win64.BUMBLELOADER.A
Backdoor.Win32.Parazit.gen (KASPERSKY)
Windows
Threat Type:
Backdoor
Destructiveness:
No
Encrypted:
Yes
In the wild::
Yes
OVERVIEW
It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Detalles de entrada
It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.
Instalación
Termina su ejecución cuando encuentra los siguientes procesos en la memoria del sistema afectado:
- ollydbg.exe
- ProcessHacker.exe
- tcpview.exe
- autoruns.exe
- autorunsc.exe
- filemon.exe
- procmon.exe
- regmon.exe
- procexp.exe
- idaq.exe
- idaq64.exe
- ImmunityDebugger.exe
- Wireshark.exe
- dumpcap.exe
- HookExplorer.exe
- ImportREC.exe
- PETools.exe
- LordPE.exe
- SysInspector.exe
- proc_analyzer.exe
- sysAnalyzer.exe
- sniff_hit.exe
- windbg.exe
- joeboxcontrol.exe
- joeboxserver.exe
- joeboxserver.exe
- ResourceHacker.exe
- x32dbg.exe
- x64dbg.exe
- Fiddler.exe
- httpdebugger.exe
Otros detalles
Hace lo siguiente:
- It hooks APIs of the current process.
- It terminates itself if it finds the following virtual machine/sandbox file artifacts in the affected system:
- %System%\drivers\VBoxMouse.sys
- %System%\drivers\VBoxGuest.sys
- %System%\drivers\VBoxSF.sys
- %System%\drivers\VBoxVideo.sys
- %System%\vboxdisp.dll
- %System%\vboxhook.dll
- %System%\vboxmrxnp.dll
- %System%\vboxogl.dll
- %System%\vboxoglarrayspu.dll
- %System%\vboxoglcrutil.dll
- %System%\vboxoglerrorspu.dll
- %System%\vboxoglfeedbackspu.dll
- %System%\vboxoglpackspu.dll
- %System%\vboxoglpassthroughspu.dll
- %System%\vboxservice.exe
- %System%\vboxtray.exe
- %System%\VBoxControl.exe
- %System%\drivers\balloon.sys
- %System%\drivers\netkvm.sys
- %System%\drivers\pvpanic.sys
- %System%\drivers\viofs.sys
- %System%\drivers\viogpudo.sys
- %System%\drivers\vioinput.sys
- %System%\drivers\viorng.sys
- %System%\drivers\vioscsi.sys
- %System%\drivers\vioser.sys
- %System%\drivers\viostor.sys
- It terminates itself if it finds the following virtual machine/sandbox directory artifacts in the affected system:
- %Program Files%\oracle\virtualbox\guest additions
- %Program Files%\qemu-ga
- %Program Files%\SPICE Guest Tools
- It terminates itself if it finds the following virtual machine/sandbox processes in the affected system's memory:
- vboxservice.exe
- vboxtray.exe
- VMSrvc.exe
- VMUSrvc.exe
- qemu-ga.exe
- vdagent.exe
- vdservice.exe
- prl_cc.exe
- prl_tools.exe
- It terminates itself if it finds the following virtual machine/sandbox network shares in the affected system:
- VirtualBox Shared Folders
- It terminates itself if it finds the following virtual devices in the affected system:
- \.\VBoxMiniRdrDN
- \.\VBoxGuest
- \.\VBoxTrayIPC
- \.\pipe\VBoxMiniRdDN
- \.\pipe\VBoxTrayIPC
- It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_NTEventLogFile entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
- vboxvideo
- VBoxVideoW8
- VBoxWddm
- It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_Bus entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
- ACPIBus_BUS_0
- PCI_BUS_0
- PNP_BUS_0
- It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_PnPEntity entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
- PCI\VEN_80EE&DEV_CAFE
- 82801FB
- 82441FX
- 82371SB
- OpenHCD
- It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_BaseBoard entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
- VirtualBox
- Oracle Corporation
- It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_PnPDevice entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
- VBOX
- VEN_VBOX
- It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_ComputerSystem entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
- VirtualBox
- HVM domU
- VMWare
- It checks for the following result of a WMI query to the Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration entry to determine if it is being run in a virtual machine or sandbox:
- 08:00:27
- Based on analysis of the codes, this malware has the following capabilities:
- Interprets the following messages as its backdoor commands:
- shi/dij - inject malicious code into one the following target processes:
- C:\Program Files\Windows Photo Viewer\ImagingDevices.exe
- C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wab.exe
- C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\wabmig.exe
- shi/dij - inject malicious code into one the following target processes:
- dex - write data into a file named wab.exe and executes it afterwards
- sdl - delete itself from the infected system via the following command:
- powershell Remove-Item -Path {File Path} -Force
- ins - enables persistence by dropping a copy of itself and creating a VBS script that executes the malware copy
- gdt - recursively delete itself from the infected system via the following command:
- powershell Remove-Item -Path {File Path} -Force -Recurse
(Nota: %System% es la carpeta del sistema de Windows, que en el caso de Windows 98 y ME suele estar en C:\Windows\System, en el caso de Windows NT y 2000 en C:\WINNT\System32 y en el caso de Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, Server 2003(32-bit), Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64bit) y 10(64-bit) en C:\Windows\System32).
. %Program Files% es la carpeta Archivos de programa predeterminada, que suele estar en C:\Archivos de programa).)
SOLUTION
Step 1
Los usuarios de Windows ME y XP, antes de llevar a cabo cualquier exploración, deben comprobar que tienen desactivada la opción Restaurar sistema para permitir la exploración completa del equipo.
Step 2
Explorar el equipo con su producto de Trend Micro para eliminar los archivos detectados como Backdoor.Win64.BUMBLELOADER.A En caso de que el producto de Trend Micro ya haya limpiado, eliminado o puesto en cuarentena los archivos detectados, no serán necesarios más pasos. Puede optar simplemente por eliminar los archivos en cuarentena. Consulte esta página de Base de conocimientos para obtener más información.
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