Análisis realizado por : Kim Benedict Victorio   
 Alias

Win64:Malware-gen (AVAST)

 Plataforma:

Windows

 Riesgo general:
 Potencial de destrucción:
 Potencial de distribución:
 Infección divulgada:
 Revelación de la información:
Bajo
Medio
High
Crítico

  • Tipo de malware
    Ransomware

  • Destructivo?
    No

  • Cifrado
    No

  • In the Wild:
    Sí

  Resumen y descripción

Canal de infección Eliminado por otro tipo de malware

It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.

Elimina los archivos de determinadas carpetas para impedir la ejecución correcta de programas y aplicaciones.

  Detalles técnicos

Tamaño del archivo 663,424 bytes
Tipo de archivo EXE
Residente en memoria No
Fecha de recepción de las muestras iniciales 22 Feb 2023
Carga útil Drops files, Deletes files, Modifies system registry, Terminates processes, Disables AV, Connects to URLs/IPs

Detalles de entrada

It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.

Instalación

Infiltra los archivos siguientes:

  • %System Root%\SystemData\MsExchangeLog1.log
  • %System Root%\SystemData\t8bjd27 (delete after)
  • %System Root%\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico

(Nota: %System Root% es la carpeta raíz, normalmente C:\. También es la ubicación del sistema operativo).

)

Agrega los procesos siguientes:

  • %System&\svchost.exe -s 63389936
  • /c ping 1 1 1 -n 10 > Nul & fsutil file setZeroData offset=0 length=663424 "{Malware Path}{Malware Name}" & Del {Malware Path}{Malware Name} /F /Q
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k NetworkService
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k LocalService
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation
  • %System%\svchost.exe -k regsvc

(Nota: %System% es la carpeta del sistema de Windows, que en el caso de Windows 98 y ME suele estar en C:\Windows\System, en el caso de Windows NT y 2000 en C:\WINNT\System32 y en el caso de Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, Server 2003(32-bit), Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64bit) y 10(64-bit) en C:\Windows\System32).

)

Crea las carpetas siguientes:

  • %System Root%\SystemData

(Nota: %System Root% es la carpeta raíz, normalmente C:\. También es la ubicación del sistema operativo).

)

Agrega las siguientes exclusiones mutuas para garantizar que solo se ejecuta una de sus copias en todo momento:

  • Global\d844900fbb575e14e52e60f2dbacaed8be2ed9effa9d82c84e86fee2e4d24d53

Este malware inyecta códigos en el/los siguiente(s) proceso(s):

  • %System&\svchost.exe -s 63389936

Otras modificaciones del sistema

Elimina los archivos de las carpetas siguientes:

  • %Application Data%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\
  • %User Temp%
  • %Temp%

(Nota: %Application Data% es la carpeta Application Data del usuario activo, que en el caso de Windows 98 y ME suele estar ubicada en C:\Windows\Profiles\{nombre de usuario}\Application Data, en el caso de Windows NT en C:\WINNT\Profiles\{nombre de usuario}\Application Data, en el caso de Windows 2000(32-bit), XP y Server 2003(32-bit) en C:\Documents and Settings\{nombre de usuario}\Local Settings\Application Data y en el caso de Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit) y 10(64-bit) en C:\Users\{nombre de usuario}\AppData\Roaming.).

. %User Temp% es la carpeta Temp del usuario activo, que en el caso de Windows 2000(32-bit), XP y Server 2003(32-bit) suele estar en C:\Documents and Settings\{nombre de usuario}\Local Settings\Temp y en el case de Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit) y 10(64-bit) en C:\Users\{nombre de usuario}\AppData\Local\Temp).

. %Temp% es la carpeta de archivos temporales de Windows, que suele estar en C:\Windows\Temp o C:\WINNT\Temp).

)

Agrega las siguientes entradas de registro:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CLASSES\
.blackbytent
(Default) = ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\
.blackbytent\DefaultIcon
(Default) = n:\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\
System
EnableLinkedConnections = 1

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\
System
LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy = 1

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
s1159 = BLACKBYTE

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
s2359 = BLACKBYTE

Elimina las siguientes claves de registro:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
vssadmin.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
wbadmin.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
bcdedit.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
powershell.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
diskshadow.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
net.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
taskkill.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
wmic.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
fsutil.exe

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Raccine

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\
Services\EventLog\Application\
Raccine

HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-2272379601-2892648605-4202271867-1000\SOFTWARE\
Raccine

HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-2272379601-2892648605-4202271867-1000\SOFTWARE\
Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
Run\Raccine Tray

Finalización del proceso

Finaliza los servicios siguientes si los detecta en el sistema afectado:

  • CybereasonRansomFree
  • vnetd
  • bpcd
  • TeraCopyService
  • msftesql
  • nsService
  • klvssbridge64
  • vapiendpoint
  • ShMonitor
  • Smcinst
  • SmcService
  • SntpService
  • svcGenericHost
  • swi_
  • TmCCSF
  • tmlisten
  • TrueKey
  • TrueKeyScheduler
  • TrueKeyServiceHelper
  • WRSVC,McTaskManager
  • OracleClientCache80
  • mfefire
  • wbengine
  • mfemms
  • RESvc
  • mfevtp
  • sacsvr
  • SAVAdminService
  • SAVService
  • SepMasterService
  • PDVFSService
  • ESHASRV
  • SDRSVC
  • FA_Scheduler
  • KAVFS
  • KAVFSGT
  • kavfsslp
  • klnagent
  • macmnsvc
  • masvc
  • MBAMService
  • MBEndpointAgent
  • McShield
  • Antivirus
  • AVP
  • DCAgent
  • bedbg
  • EhttpSrv
  • MMS
  • ekrn
  • EPSecurityService
  • EPUpdateService
  • ntrtscan
  • EsgShKernel
  • msexchangeadtopology
  • AcrSch2Svc
  • MSOLAP$TPSAMA
  • Intel(R) PROSet Monitoring
  • msexchangeimap4
  • ARSM
  • unistoresvc_1af40a
  • ReportServer$TPS
  • MSOLAP$SYSTEM_BGC
  • W3Svc
  • MSExchangeSRS
  • ReportServer$TPSAMA
  • Zoolz 2 Service
  • MSOLAP$TPS
  • aphidmonitorservice
  • SstpSvc
  • MSExchangeMTA
  • ReportServer$SYSTEM_BGC
  • Symantec System Recovery
  • UI0Detect
  • MSExchangeSA
  • MSExchangeIS
  • ReportServer
  • MsDtsServer110
  • POP3Svc
  • MSExchangeMGMT
  • SMTPSvc
  • MsDtsServer
  • IisAdmin
  • MSExchangeES
  • EraserSvc11710
  • Enterprise Client Service
  • MsDtsServer100
  • NetMsmqActivator
  • stc_raw_agent
  • VSNAPVSS
  • PDVFSService
  • AcrSch2Svc
  • Acronis
  • CASAD2DWebSvc
  • CAARCUpdateSvc
  • McAfee
  • avpsus
  • DLPAgentService
  • mfewc
  • BMR Boot Service
  • DefWatch
  • ccEvtMgr
  • ccSetMgr
  • SavRoam
  • RTVscan
  • QBFCService
  • QBIDPService
  • IntuitQuickBooksFCS
  • QBCFMonitorService
  • YooIT
  • zhudongfangyu
  • raccine
  • cylance
  • screenconnect
  • ransom
  • sqltelemetry
  • msexch
  • vnc
  • teamviewer
  • msolap
  • veeam
  • backup
  • sql
  • memtas
  • vss
  • sophos
  • svc$
  • mepocs

Finaliza los procesos siguientes si detecta que se ejecutan en la memoria del sistema afectado:

  • teracopy
  • nsservice
  • nsctrl
  • uranium
  • processhacker
  • procmon
  • pestudio
  • procmon64
  • x32dbg
  • x64dbg
  • cff explorer
  • procexp
  • pslist
  • tcpview
  • tcpvcon
  • dbgview
  • rammap
  • rammap64
  • vmmap
  • ollydbg
  • autoruns
  • autorunsc
  • filemon
  • regmon
  • idaq
  • idaq64
  • immunitydebugger
  • wireshark
  • dumpcap
  • hookexplorer
  • importrec
  • petools
  • lordpe
  • sysinspector
  • proc_analyzer
  • sysanalyzer
  • sniff_hit
  • windbg
  • joeboxcontrol
  • joeboxserver
  • joeboxserver
  • resourcehacker
  • fiddler
  • httpdebugger
  • dumpit
  • rammap
  • rammap64
  • vmmap
  • agntsvc
  • cntaosmgr
  • dbeng50
  • dbsnmp
  • encsvc
  • infopath
  • isqlplussvc
  • mbamtray
  • msaccess
  • msftesql
  • mspub
  • mydesktopqos
  • mydesktopservice
  • mysqld
  • mysqld-nt
  • mysqld-opt
  • Ntrtscan
  • ocautoupds
  • ocomm
  • ocssd
  • onenote
  • oracle
  • outlook
  • PccNTMon
  • powerpnt
  • sqbcoreservice
  • sql
  • sqlagent
  • sqlbrowser
  • sqlservr
  • sqlwriter
  • steam
  • synctime
  • tbirdconfig
  • thebat
  • thebat64
  • thunderbird
  • tmlisten
  • visio
  • winword
  • wordpad
  • xfssvccon
  • zoolz

Otros detalles

It connects to the following possibly malicious URL:

  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.150
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.248
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.136
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.135
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.154
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.22
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.101
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.253
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.97
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.169
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.192
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.24
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.100
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.105
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.208
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.136
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.213
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.216
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.214
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.218
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.239
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.225
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.231
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.230
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.125
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.160
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.152
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.5
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.6
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.38
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.66
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.167
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.235
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.11
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.9
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.85
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.143
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.211
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.4
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.116
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.96
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.174
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.201
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.13
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.9
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.12
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.7
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.10
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.28
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.24
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.29
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.38
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.39
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.37
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.51
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.43
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.42
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.19
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.20
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.21
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.16
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.18
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.25
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.68
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.72
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.80
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.81
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.89
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.101
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.104
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.105
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.102
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.112
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.113
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.117
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.120
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.175
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.126
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.142
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.166
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.110
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.5
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.156
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.10
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.34
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.35
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.39
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.38
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.44
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.69
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.68
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.88
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.90
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.93
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.96
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.134
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.156
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.101
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.133
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.153
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.180
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.209
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.218
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.225
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.252
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.8
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.71
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.89
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.88
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.90
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.114
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.175
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.216
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.217
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.48
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.56
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.61
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.65
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.66
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.67
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.74
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.76
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.87
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.85
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.107
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.101
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.105
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.108
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.123
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.115
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.119
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.125
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.122
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.188
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.191
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.197
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.196
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.202
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.73
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.82
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.146
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.159
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.91
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.115
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.251
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.37
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.60
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.95
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.138
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.160
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.166
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.236
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.245
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.54
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.128
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.25
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.95
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.150
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.28
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.141
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.180
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.1
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.8
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.64
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.203
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.200
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.131
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.132
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.217
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.3
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.2
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.71
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.69
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.241
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.228
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.4
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.4
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.249
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.231
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.140
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.137
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.48
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.40
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.41
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.81
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.79
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.120
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.106
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.119
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.71
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.158
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.40
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.110
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.249
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.87
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.200
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.164
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.76
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.188
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.5
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.223
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.35
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.159
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.237
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.61
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.7
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.243
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.244
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.18
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.222
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.153
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.152
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.116
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.3
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.13
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.120
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.147
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.157
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.9
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.165
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.236
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.20
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.3
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.42
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.245
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.170
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.2
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.41
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.52
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.162
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.248
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.73
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.202
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.254
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.211
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.28
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.208
  • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.235

Hace lo siguiente:

  • It starts the following service:
    • TrustedInstaller
  • It accepts the following parameters:
    • -s 63389936 → required to continue to its routine
    • -a → compares the filename with “myapp.exe” to terminate and remove itself
    • -q
    • -w
    • svc
  • It DOES NOT continue to routine if User Default Language ID of the system is any of the following:
    • Russian (0x0419)
    • Armenia (0x042B)
    • Azerbaijan(Cyrillic) (0x082C)
    • Azerbaijan(Latin) (0x042C)
    • Belarus (0x0423)
    • Georgia (0x0437)
    • Kazakstan (0x043F)
    • Tajik(Cyrillic) (0x0428)
    • Turkmen (0x0442)
    • Uzbekistan(Cyrillic) (0x0843)
    • Uzbekistan(Latin) (0x0443)
  • It checks if the following virtual machine or sandbox related module(s) is loaded in the affected system:
    • avghooka.dll
    • avghookx.dll
    • sxin.dll
    • sf2.dll
    • sbiedll.dll
    • snxhk.dll
    • cmdvrt32.dll
    • cmdvrt64.dll
    • wpespy.dll
    • vmcheck.dll
    • pstorec.dll
    • dir_watch.dll
    • api_log.dll
    • dbghelp.dll
  • Enumerate all the files under C:\Windows\system32\drivers.
  • Find the substring of AV vendors under file properties of each driver.
  • Find the substring of AV vendors with file path.
  • It checks and compares the company name from the file properties if it has a substring of the following:
    • tanium
    • malwarebytes
    • emsisoft
    • elastic endpoint
    • trend micro
    • eset nod
    • carbonblack
    • mcafee
    • crowdstrike
    • cylance
    • fireeye
    • kaspersky
    • sentinelone
    • symantec
    • bitdefender
    • comodo
    • doctor web
    • f-secure
    • panda software
    • sophos
    • webroot
    • veeam
    • avast
    • acronis
    • aomei

  Soluciones

Motor de exploración mínimo 9.800
Primer archivo de patrones de VSAPI 18.272.04
Primera fecha de publicación de patrones de VSAPI 22 de febrero de 2023
Versión de patrones OPR de VSAPI 18.273.00
Fecha de publicación de patrones OPR de VSAPI 23 de febrero de 2023

Step 2

Los usuarios de Windows ME y XP, antes de llevar a cabo cualquier exploración, deben comprobar que tienen desactivada la opción Restaurar sistema para permitir la exploración completa del equipo.

Step 3

Note that not all files, folders, and registry keys and entries are installed on your computer during this malware's/spyware's/grayware's execution. This may be due to incomplete installation or other operating system conditions. If you do not find the same files/folders/registry information, please proceed to the next step.

Step 4

Eliminar este valor del Registro

[ aprenda más ]

Importante: si modifica el Registro de Windows incorrectamente, podría hacer que el sistema funcione mal de manera irreversible. Lleve a cabo este paso solo si sabe cómo hacerlo o si puede contar con ayuda de su administrador del sistema. De lo contrario, lea este artículo de Microsoft antes de modificar el Registro del equipo.

  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CLASSES\.blackbytent
    • (Default) = ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!
  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\.blackbytent\DefaultIcon
    • (Default) = n:\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico
  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
    • EnableLinkedConnections = 1
  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
    • LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy = 1
  • In HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
    • s1159 = BLACKBYTE
  • In HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\International
    • s2359 = BLACKBYTE

Step 5

Buscar y eliminar este archivo

[ aprenda más ]
Puede que algunos de los archivos del componente estén ocultos. Asegúrese de que tiene activada la casilla Buscar archivos y carpetas ocultos en la opción Más opciones avanzadas para que el resultado de la búsqueda incluya todos los archivos y carpetas ocultos.
  • %System Root%\SystemData\MsExchangeLog1.log
  • %System Root%\SystemData\{Random Characters}.ico

Step 6

Buscar y eliminar estas carpetas

[ aprenda más ]
Asegúrese de que tiene activada la casilla Buscar archivos y carpetas ocultos en la opción Más opciones avanzadas para que el resultado de la búsqueda incluya todas las carpetas ocultas.
  • %System Root%\SystemData

Step 7

Explorar el equipo con su producto de Trend Micro para eliminar los archivos detectados como Ransom.Win64.BLACKBYTE.THBBBBC En caso de que el producto de Trend Micro ya haya limpiado, eliminado o puesto en cuarentena los archivos detectados, no serán necesarios más pasos. Puede optar simplemente por eliminar los archivos en cuarentena. Consulte esta página de Base de conocimientos para obtener más información.

Step 8

Restore this file from backup only Microsoft-related files will be restored. If this malware/grayware also deleted files related to programs that are not from Microsoft, please reinstall those programs on you computer again.

  • %Application Data%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\{Files}
  • %User Temp%\{Files}
  • %Temp%\{Files}

Step 9

Restore encrypted files from backup.


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